Devoncroft Verdict: The low valuation of Grass Valley does not make this a “bad deal.” On the contrary, the final agreement massively shifted the deal terms in the favor of Black Dragon Capital, who appears to have negotiated a fantastic deal for one of the broadcast industry’s marquee brands.

It’s a remarkably bad deal for Belden, who had already designated Grass Valley as a discontinued asset and presumably wanted to move on and get the asset divested (especially with a new CEO in place for just over one quarter).

It’s a very good deal for Black Dragon Capital, and if they can achieve their stated vision of creating a transformed Grass Valley it will become a great deal for them.

In a regulatory filing describing the final terms of the transaction, Belden describes the aggregate consideration of the above five components as approximately $295 million.

Note that this is 16.4% less than the $353 million Derksen told analysts on February 4, 2020, based on the original deal terms.

Regardless, we were unable to arrive at an obvious summation of the five components of the final deal terms that resulted in $295 million.  Instead, our back of the envelope calculations (which exclude the presumably short-term $3 million equity investment), sums to $562 million, or $508 million excluding cash in the business ($67m + $175m + $88m + $178m = $508m), compared to $602 million in the original deal, using the same math.

This is not a good or bad thing. We can work only with publicly disclosed figures and we have no inside knowledge of transaction specifics.  Although Belden has not offered an explanation, we suspect the difference is likely explained by adjustments for retained liabilities (discussed below), or discounting of the future payments, both to account for time value of money and the likelihood of actual receipt of the funds (much more on this below).

Still, the details are a little confusing, so we created the animation below that visualizes the original and final deal terms.  Admittedly it is over-simplified by useful in illustrating the complexity of the deal.

The most obvious takeaway from a comparison of the original and final deal terms is that the price changed considerably.

The repricing of the deal is almost certainly due to a combination of the current market environment and Grass Valley’s poor Q1 2020 financial performance.

Using Belden’s Q1 2020 regulatory filings, we estimate that Grass Valley’s year-over-year revenues in Q1 2020 declined by 41%, to approximately $51 million.  Like virtually all other companies, the quarter was severely impacted by COVID-related disruptions starting in mid-March 2020 (note that Belden management has stated publicly on multiple occasions that a disproportionate amount of Grass Valley’s sales occur in the final few weeks of any given quarter, and with much of the world on lockdown, the company was almost certainly impacted.

Grass Valley’s Q1 2020 revenue shortfall contributed to a gross margin result of 31% for the quarter and an operating loss of $33.6 million ($10 million loss prior to the latest asset impairment charge).

And it appears Belden’s loss became Black Dragon’s gain.

This was effectively confirmed in a LinkedIn post by Frank Capria, a member of the Black Dragon deal team, who said the current market environment offered an opportunity for Black Dragon to renegotiation the deal on more favorable terms.

Reviewing the impact of changes to the original deal terms

Having briefly reviewed the publicly available terms of the final transaction, we believe the deal has become slightly more rather than less complex (but also substantially more favorable to Black Dragon Capital and Grass Valley).

Understanding the final deal terms requires “unpacking” the details, along with a reference to the original terms.

Accordingly, we review in order below each form of consideration in the final deal terms.

1.   $120 million upfront payment (originally $140 million):

The upfront cash consideration of $120 million seems clear-cut at first glance, but Belden’s July 2, 2020 press release notes that the net cash consideration is $67 million, versus a contemplated $120 million under the original terms – a decrease of 44% ($120 million vs. $67 million), in favor of Black Dragon, compared to the original deal terms.

Accordingly, it is now more appropriate to view the upfront cash portion at the net amount of $67 million rather than the previously contemplated $140 million cash payment, with Belden leaving only $20 million of cash with Grass Valley.

Moreover, a recent Belden regulatory filing dated the day after the announced transaction in February indicated a portion of the then $140 million upfront payment would be funded through a new debt offering.  Neither the Belden nor Grass Valley press releases discuss the source of funds.

This implies Belden is “selling” Black Dragon approximately $52 million of cash along with the Grass Valley business, compared to the approximately $20 million previously contemplated, and reduces the aggregate consideration value to Belden by the same amount.

The amount of cash left in the Grass Valley business as per the final deal terms represents an increase of 160% (in favor of Black Dragon) compared to the original deal terms.

Focusing on the source of funds used for the upfront payment may seem pedantic, but it is an important distinction because of the impact to the going-forward Grass Valley business and because of the nature of the other deal components.

First, the responsibility for servicing any debt used to fund the transaction will rest with Grass Valley.  This will create a burden on Grass Valley’s ability to invest in its business, which is a potential concern to customers.

According to Belden’s regulatory filing in February 2020, Black Dragon’s ability to secure this new debt financing was a closing condition to the deal. Belden’s filing says that “actual results could differ materially from those reflected in the Form 8-K for various reasons, including the failure of the Company to meet closing conditions and the failure of the Buyer to obtain its expected financing.”

The customary sequence of events in M&A deals is for the buyer (in this instance Black Dragon) to secure the financing from a third-party lender based on the cash flow or assets of the target business (in this instance Grass Valley) and then at the time of the closing, the funds raised by the lender are provided to the seller (in this instance Belden) with the debt obligation remaining with the target business (Grass Valley).

The use of debt to support the initial payment would not be surprising since some back-of-the-envelope math shows that the value of the gross up-front payment ($120 million) represents approximately 2x Grass Valley’s 2019 EBITDA (the funds available to service debt).  What is unclear currently is the size of the debt offering (which is an amount less than $120 million) versus an equity contribution from Black Dragon.  Neither Belden nor Black Dragon Capital have made public statements on this matter.  In speaking with both the Grass Valley and Black Dragon neither expressed any concern around the impact of this financing component.

2.  $175 million Sellers Note (previously $213 million):

Belden issued a 5-year Sellers Note for $175 million. In substance, this is a future obligation calling for a payment by Black Dragon to Belden in five years at the stated value of $175 million.   Under the original deal terms the value of this note was $213 million in the original deal terms.  The renegotiation reduced this figure by approximately 18%.

It is important to make clear the cash flow associated with the Seller Note: there is none today.

The promise of the future payment creates a ‘debt’ obligation in the future for Grass Valley and an ‘asset’ for Belden today.  Black Dragon pays nothing today; Belden receives nothing today.

Transactions including seller-note financing usually occur when a traditional source of funding is not possible on the terms desired. Consequently, this type of deal structure is typically not the first choice of sellers – especially a financially-sophisticated seller such as Belden – because the seller maintains risk exposure in the divested entity.

Before choosing to view this in a negative light, keep in mind during divestitures it is challenging to describe the going-forward cash flows of a newly independent organization and a Sellers Note can serve as a vehicle to bridge to a more traditional financing.

Nevertheless, by issuing the $175 million Sellers Note Belden has agreed to finance 65%+ of the contractually guaranteed payments (i.e. the two of four deal components that are not subject to Grass Valley’s future financial performance) from Black Dragon Capital for the purchase of Grass Valley for a period of at least five years.

But it transpires that the Sellers Note may not actually be for $175 million as described. The final amount of the Sellers Note was previously contemplated as $213 million (now $175 million) less any amount of Grass Valley’s UK pension liabilities assumed by Black Dragon Capital.

The root of this issue is traced back to Belden’s acquisition of Snell Advanced Media (SAM) in February 2018.  When Belden acquired SAM, it also acquired liabilities arising from final salary pension schemes in at least two companies previously acquired by SAM. At the time Belden bought SAM, the outstanding UK pension liability was $31.7 million (it is likely smaller in early 2020 but still meaningful).

For obvious reasons, Black Dragon did not want to assume these liabilities. And according to two statements in Belden’s 2019 10-K filing, it appears Black Dragon avoided most or all of them.

 “The Agreement provides for us to receive $140 million in cash, a subordinated note with an initial face amount of $213 million (less the amount of certain pension liabilities being assumed by the Buyer);

The Agreement requires that, prior to closing, [Belden] transfer [Grass Valley’s] U.K. pension obligations to one of our non-Grass Valley subsidiaries, obtain any required approvals in connection with that transfer, and fulfill various other closing conditions. We expect the sale to close in the first half of 2020.”

The reduction of the Seller Note, however, does not reduce the size of the deal.  All things being equal, saving a $1 liability is the same as receiving a $1 asset today.  In this instance the asset is not today, but rather five years in the future (and a $1 today is more valuable than $1 in the future).  The trade then raises the value of the deal since it is trading a $1 defined liability (from Belden to Black Dragon) today for a $1 future asset (from Black Dragon to Belden).

Of course, the reverse is true.  Every $1 of the liability Belden retains equates to a reduction of deal value.  Grass Valley’s Q1 2020 balance sheet indicates a $5.3 million pension obligation will remain with the business.  This would then reduce the Seller Note by $5.3 million.  Since it would appear Belden is retaining substantially all of the liability (based on filings perhaps $20 – $25 million), this represents a reduction of upfront deal value of perhaps 30% of the net cash proceeds (remember net cash is $67 million).  Belden is then selling a business with tangible net assets of over $200 million (as of December 31, 2019) and around $50 million of 2019 EBITDA for an initial net price of perhaps $45 million.

Before moving on from a discussion of the Seller note, we must point out that it appears the term of the Sellers Note may extend beyond the initially described 5-year period. This was disclosed in Belden’s February regulatory filing, which included the following contract language that describes the potential duration of the Sellers Note.

“The note is contemplated to be a five-year instrument, but that term is subject to extension if the Buyer’s senior indebtedness is extended beyond December 31, 2025.”

In other words, should Black Dragon Capital (in practice Grass Valley since the future debt will be paid by Grass Valley) chooses to extend the debt facility used to fund the upfront gross payment of $120 million beyond December 31, 2025, the term of the Sellers note will also extend beyond five years (so will the PIK interest described below), making the term of the note potentially open-ended.

3.  PIK interest: 

Payment-in-kind (PIK) is a mechanism whereby interest is accrued as additional principal on an obligation and the borrower can thus avoid making interest payment until the maturity date of the obligation.  In other words, Belden will not receive any payment from Black Dragon / Grass Valley for five years, but instead will see an increase in the seller note by $88 million.

Note that PIK interest of $88 million is based on the Seller Note of $175 million at an 8.5% annual compounding interest rate. The original deal terms called for PIK interest of $130 million based on the Seller Note of $213 million at a 10% annual compounding interest rate. This means Black Dragon negotiated a 32% reduction in PIK interest due to Belden at the end of five years.

Belden’s management has stated the PIK facility is not dependent on the future performance of Grass Valley.

This would then mean of the first three components of value Belden is financing 70%+ of the consideration.

4.  Potential Earn-Out:

The entirety of the references to the earn-out are a statements by Belden management during its Q4 2019 earnings call and a February 2020 regulatory filing indicating (i) the maximum value attainable of $150 million and (ii) the contingency of earn-out depending on Black Dragon earning “an agreed upon return on its equity investment.”

The deal announcement press release revises the earn-out to $178, an 18% increase.

Assuming the same contingency exists as described in February regulatory filings, dependency is not any achievement of specific operating target, rather the return on equity of the buyer.

One increases equity returns by decreasing the initial equity investment (i.e. more debt, lower purchase price, non-cash deal components, etc.) or increasing the ultimate equity exit value (i.e. sell the business for a large cash price) or some combination of the two.  Tying the payment to the equity return of the new owners, rather an operating target, is a vote of confidence in Belden’s view of the Black Dragon team’s ability to generate a successful future sale of Grass Valley.

By having an earn-out or other forms of contingent consideration, a seller can reasonably claim a higher (possible) deal value.  Having covered many M&A transactions in this sector, earn-outs tend to occupy a much more prominent positioning in press releases than they ever reach in practice.

5.  A $3 million equity investment by Belden in Grass Valley:

The final deal terms reveal a curious addition calling for Belden to make a $3 million equity investment in Grass Valley (a business Belden had owned 100% of the equity and has now sold).  Belden has the right to put the equity investment back to Black Dragon at any time during the next 120 days.  In more plain terms, the ‘put’ means Belden can cause Black Dragon to buy the equity position back at – we presume – the same valuation in the next 120 days.

There is only a one sentence disclosure of this condition in Belden’s press release.  It raises several questions as to why the $3 million could not have been folded into the upfront cash consideration, why it requires an equity position, or why the 120-day convention.  We can only guess at the motivations, and we prefer to refrain from guessing.

Deal analysis:

Belden’s management has issued no revised statements about the deal or how investors should the view the deal.  We will instead work from management’s disclosures during its Q4 2019 conference call.  Notably the below comments came before the present lowering of the deal terms.

During Belden’s Q4 2019 call with analysts, Belden’s CFO Henk Derksen stated “the best way to think about valuation [of the Grass Valley business] is $140 million, the $213 seller’s note is about $353 million, it’s about 1x revenue.” (Grass Valley’s historical financial performance is covered in an earlier post).

This was curious logic.  To illustrate, let’s make it a more familiar problem by dropping the moniker of millions and recasting in the form of this first-person statement.  “How does this sound for a deal? I will lend you $21, you pay me $14, and then let us call it a $35 total transaction!”

The above is only intended to illustrate the value of a deal is the value you receive, not the value you negotiate.

While we dispute Belden management’s characterization of a 1x revenue valuation, we acknowledge this was the best offer available for Grass Valley.

It’s worth pausing and reflecting on this for a moment.

Belden made a public disclosure on its intention to sell the business and retained JP Morgan to run a structured sale process.  Further, at the time Belden announced its intention to divest Grass Valley (late 2019), there was more than $800 billion of capital controlled by US private equity firms having a purchasing power of perhaps $2.4 billion (with leverage and reinvested equity) this was (and remains) the best deal available for Grass Valley.

Note that Belden spent approximately $700 million in cash on the acquisitions of the precedent businesses of Telecast, Miranda, Softel, Grass Valley, and SAM.

Forget the market disruption of the first half of 2020, those were unknown at the time this deal was agreed.  Consider only that Grass Valley was in 2019 around $350 – $360 million revenue business operating at around 18% EBITDA margins, and was positioned to benefit from the calendar of live events in 2020 as well as the increasing deployment of IP-based technology by broadcasters and media companies world-wide.

If it’s likely that Grass Valley will benefit from secular tailwinds over the next few years, then this was an attractive valuation at an effective price (original terms) of $120 million in cash (~2x trailing EBITDA) and a lot of contingent promises based on vague future criteria that sound good in a press release.

Further, Derksen specifically told analysts that the $353 million (the upfront $140 million payment, plus the principal of the $213 million Sellers Note) is not tied to performance.”

While this may be correct as a contractual matter, in the cold practical real world all the disbursements beyond the $140 million upfront payment are in practice dependent entirely on the performance of Grass Valley for at least the next five years.

The only way the Sellers Note will be paid in five years (or ever) is if Grass Valley has the funds to pay it.  The possible sources of future funds are either (i) an increase in the cash flow of Grass Valley; or (ii) an increase in the equity value of Grass Valley.  Therefore, ALL future remuneration to Belden is subject to the future performance of Grass Valley and by extension Black Dragon’s ability to drive that performance.

Thus, it appears Belden has entered into a deal that leaves them on the hook for Grass Valley and actually created a situation where Belden has more financial risk (skin in the game from a divested asset) in Grass Valley than Black Dragon – Grass Valley’s new owners. In other words, Belden remains subject to many Grass Valley-related performance because it financed ~70% of the deal value (not including potential PIK interest and/or earn-out), before taking into account the ~$25 million of UK pension liabilities that Belden is keeping on its books.

As a general observation, this is the type of deal structure a seller resorts to after having explored all more straightforward options.

The vast majority of the stated consideration is several years in the future, or dependent on the future performance of a business the seller no longer controls, or both.

Rather than calling it a partnership, it is more appropriate to think of the transaction as an investment by Belden in Black Dragon.

The structuring of the deal is then most likely explained either by Belden’s belief in the operational history and expertise of Black Dragon to generate a significant escalation in the value of Grass Valley, or a reflection in the lack of alternative options available to Belden, or a bit of both.

It is worth reiterating Belden’s primary goal of the divestiture is to cease ownership of Grass Valley and a secondary goal is to reclaim as much value as possible.  The divestiture allowed Belden to designate Grass Valley as discontinued operations.

During the third quarter of 2019, Belden wrote-down the carrying value of Grass Valley by $342.1 million, which is spread across the intangible assets of goodwill ($326.1 million), customer relationship ($14.4 million), trademarks ($1.6 million).  The goodwill balance was created during Belden’s prior acquisitions of Miranda, Grass Valley, and SAM.

In the fourth quarter Belden added a further impairment write-down of $180.4 million, bringing the total 2019 write-down of Grass Valley to $521.4 million.

To lay out the accounting sequence, Belden’s Grass Valley subsidiary started the 2019 calendar with $628 million dollars of net asset value.  During the third quarter the team revisited certain intangible assets and determined the asset values were then overstated by $342.1 million.  Fair value was determined during Q3 2019 by “calculating the present values of their estimated future cash flows.”

During the fourth quarter and because of the sale price agreed with Black Dragon, Belden determined it was necessary to impair the assets of Grass Valley by a further $180.4 million.  The filing states,

“We determined the estimated fair values of the assets and of the reporting unit by calculating the present values of their estimated future cash flows, which was based in part on the assumed proceeds from a divestiture of Grass Valley.”

Note that a $180 million charge against Grass Valley’s end of year 2019 balance sheet is more than the company’s balance of remaining intangible assets and would have to apply against tangible components of value.  Belden decided to create a contra-asset to capture the additional write-downs.

Below is an illustration of the impact of the 2019 impairments on Grass Valley’s balance sheet.

The above write-downs were joined by another $23.2 million impairment of Grass Valley at the conclusion of Q1 2020, bringing the total impairment charges to $545.7 million since January 1, 2019.

While not stated explicitly in the filings, the implication is the accountant’s determination of the fair value of all the components of the deal is less than $200 million, thereby necessitating the further impairment.

To put this in plain business terms, it appears the original deal terms valued Grass Valley at lower than its tangible net asset value. Remember, this valuation is from February 2020.  The final deal terms highlight an even further decline in Grass Valley’s valuation.

How can a profitable business sell for less than tangible net asset value?  This is a first for us.  It is logical consistent accounting.  Otherwise, the write-down and transaction would create a paradox where a write-down is necessitated by a review of the cash flows of an asset, while an arms-length transaction with a valuation based on those same cash flows would have created an asset.

Again, we dispute Belden management’s characterization of a 1x revenue valuation. In our opinion, neither the net cash received, the fair value estimates, nor common sense allow for the conclusion that this was a 1.0x revenue sale.

Having said that, don’t lose sight of the bigger picture for Belden.  By moving the $521.4 million write-down to discontinued operations, Belden’s negative $377 million 2019 GAAP net income is in large measure improved to a positive $209 million adjusted net income.

A criticism of a seller is perhaps better leveled as a complement to the buyer.  The mechanism of the Sellers Note with PIK keeps the cash flow of Grass Valley within the business of Grass Valley (so the management team can invest in growth initiatives, etc.) rather than continually siphoning off profits to pay debt holders – and Grass Valley is going to need the investment funds.  As the press releases and associated announcements make clear, Grass Valley has some investments to make to transition its business to new business models.

The early February Black Dragon Capital press release announcing the deal includes the following three quotes in succession:

Louis Hernandez Jr. [Founder and Managing Director of Black Dragon]: 

“We’re excited by the opportunity Grass Valley has to lead in an industry where other heritage brands have struggled. Grass Valley’s investments in cloud-based and Software as a Service (SaaS) solutions are promising. We believe the combination of a broad product suite, a great team, and the direction of the market will make Grass Valley the partner of choice as the digitization of the space accelerates.”

Tim Shoulders [CEO of Grass Valley]: 

“We are excited about this new phase for Grass Valley. Black Dragon’s experience and vision will help us accelerate our move to cloud-based and SaaS solution product lines that will please customers seeking the most robust and flexible models for content production and delivery.”

John Stroup [CEO of Belden]:

“We are very pleased to partner with Black Dragon Capital. Their deep media-related expertise, proven track record and relationships in the broadcast community make them the perfect partner to drive Grass Valley to the next level.”

There is a noticeable theme of transitioning the Grass Valley business to a cloud-based and SaaS solution model.  There is also great attention given to the expertise and familiarity of the Black Dragon team and with good reason.  Louis Hernandez Jr. is after all an alumni speaker (twice) at the annual Devoncroft Executive Summit | Las Vegas.

Such a transition in business model will take time and substantial investment (as discussed in earlier posts). Undiscussed – at this time – is the complement of resources available to Grass Valley to fund this transition.

According to Belden, at the time the transaction closes, Belden will transfer to Black Dragon the Grass Valley business with “an agreed-upon level of cash and other working capital.”

Under the original deal terms, this was contemplated to be about $20 million.  Based on the deal announcement, we the agreed upon level of cash appears to have jumped to $53 million.

As of the March 31, 2020, Grass Valley had total assets of $344.2 million against liabilities of $135.4 million (the working capital accounts are not disclosed).  Grass Valley will no longer benefit from the shared corporate functions provided by Belden (HR, finance, etc.), though according to Grass Valley, there is not a substantial incremental expense burden envisioned.  Belden called out a shared services agreement during its third quarter 2019 earnings to allow for an orderly transition of shared corporate functions.  The transaction service agreement was referenced in Grass Valley’s press release, though no terms of the agreement were disclosed.

Subtracting from the above is the debt service associated with the borrowings to support the $120 million upfront cash payment.  The amounts are unknown, but this is an important point for the going-forward Grass Valley business and the customers of Grass Valley.  While we have discussed the upfront payment on a net cash basis, it is crucial to make clear the monies actually change hands.  In the case of Grass Valley this will create a debt balance and associated interest payment, which is then a draw on operating cash and impacts the business investment capability of the Grass Valley business.

Black Dragon’s access to capital is not discussed as part of any of the transaction announcements or fillings, and a third-party observe could view the transaction as having the potential to exhaust Grass Valley’s access to capital outside its own remaining cash flow and the equity resources of Black Dragon.

And while Louis Hernandez Jr. is well-known in the industry, Black Dragon is not.  According to SEC regulatory filings, Black Dragon is in the midst of a $125 million fundraising, having secured $33.9 million of this goal as of late 2019.  Because Black Dragon is in the middle of fundraising, the firm is not able to comment on access to funds and also under no obligation as a private pool of capital.

The above only highlights the lack of information in the public domain about Black Dragon’s access to capital or its intended views on how to finance Grass Valley’s business model transition.

We therefore discussed (in February 2020) this very point with Louis, who has direct experience managing the cash flow impact inherent in transitioning a business away from capital expenditure technology deployments toward cloud-based technology deployments and subscription business models.  While serving as the Chairman and CEO of Avid, Louis not only had to manage the business model transition, but also an associated public financial restatement, all undertaken with a constrained cash position.

An expansive enterprise customer base, diverse product portfolio, and substantial initial progress along the transition give Louis great confidence about the Grass Valley’s ability to not just succeed in the transition, but to avoid the need for substantial additional infusions of capital to fund the transition.

Louis and the firm he founded (Black Dragon) are all-in on the investment.  Black Dragon is not going to earn a return based on clever financial engineering; the only way Black Dragon earns a return is by driving a material increase in the equity valuation of Grass Valley.

And ultimately the structure itself is a bet by Belden management on the same proposition: that Grass Valley under Black Dragon ownership can both transition its business without substantial additional equity investment and can substantially grow the value of the business.

Perception matters when making long-lived technology investments – this transaction has the potential to impact the perception of Grass Valley either positively or negatively.

Customers who made a big commitment to Grass Valley in 2019 with the expectation of the corporate resources of Belden supporting future product investment are now relying on a different owner with a different corporate profile.

There are two main components involved in a customer making a long-term commitment to technology supplier.  The first is an aligned view on the technology roadmap, and the second is a belief the technology supplier can execute on the technology roadmap.

Customers are the ultimate arbiter of these points.  Both Grass Valley and Black Dragon have extensive customer relationships in the global media sector and have already started in earnest to discuss these points with customers.

So then two final points to consider about the future: How will the transaction and post-transaction activity impact the perception of the ‘Vision of the Future’ for Grass Valley and the ‘Stability’ of the business?

To illustrate the possible impact, consider two league tables from Devoncroft’s 2019 Big Broadcast Survey (BBS) about Stability and ‘Vision of the Future.’

As a reminder, the BBS has been tracking the brand drivers of 100+ technology suppliers active in the global media technology sector for more than a decade.

Below are the league tables for the top 30 ranked brands for the driver of Stability and for the driver of ‘Vision of the Future.’  For added emphasis, please keep in mind the rankings are based on global technology purchasers and users.  It is sorted in alphabetical order.  You will note the appearance of Grass Valley: A Belden Brand in the Stability league table, but not the ‘Vision of the Future’ table.

The rankings for the above were gathered during the first half of 2019, well in advance of the public disclosure by Belden to divest Grass Valley.

How will the acquisition by Black Dragon impact customers views on the Stability and ‘Vision of the Future’ of Grass Valley?  And more broadly, how does the current level of M&A activity in the supplier community impact customer purchase decisions?  These are topics will intend to explore in depth with the release of the 2020 Big Broadcast Survey data and in future posts.

If you made it to the end of this post, we applaud you.

Related Content:

Devoncroft Podcast: Waiting for Closure — Belden, Grass Valley, and Black Dragon Capital

Belden Press Release: Belden Announces Completion of Grass Valley Divestiture

Grass Valley Pres Release: Grass Valley Acquisition by Black Dragon Capital Completed

Belden to sell Grass Valley to PE Firm Headed by Former Avid Chairman and CEO

Belden Announces Intent to Divest Grass Valley, Exit Media Technology Sector

Podcast: Tim Shoulders, President Grass Valley, Discussing the Impact to Media Technology Supplier Community

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